Book Party,
Sunday 3PM
June 4
Come Celebrate!
5 Books - 5 Poets
Martine Bellen
Ruth Danon
Jordan Davis
Caroline Hagood
Jerome Sala
Books available
Refreshments
Jefferson Market Library
425 6th Avenue, NYC
FREE
Find out more here!
Book Party,
Sunday 3PM
June 4
Come Celebrate!
5 Books - 5 Poets
Martine Bellen
Ruth Danon
Jordan Davis
Caroline Hagood
Jerome Sala
Books available
Refreshments
Jefferson Market Library
425 6th Avenue, NYC
FREE
Find out more here!
You’ve seen it spreading rapidly through Facebook. Perhaps you’ve been infected yourself.
I’m not referring to Covid-19, but another kind of virus: the “Poetry Marathon” that travels with the mysterious hashtag of #PeetMeNotLeave”—promising participants eventual publication in something called “The Russian Almanac.” What's asked of poets who join in is that they share eight of their poems over eight days on Facebook and ask eight others to do the same.
Such chains appear frequently on FB, collecting everything from photos to favorite books. One reason the current iteration of the form has been greeted with such enthusiasm is because people get to share their own work with poets they admire.
Full disclosure: I bowed out, as I usually do from these chains. My own time is constrained, and I feel weird burdening others with such requests. But I‘ve seen poets actually asking for invitations to join in. So, I guess my own inhibitions speak more to personal nervousness than politeness.
In any case, this particular chain is producing some high-quality curation. I’ve heard people remark that the poems they’re reading as a result of #PeetMeNotLeave are at least as good the what’s in pubs out there—even counting established literary magazines. This isn’t surprising, as much of what appears was probably previously published.
Nevertheless, you can’t help wondering about the source of enthusiasm behind this particular chain.
I think a clue is found in the form of the chain. As it asks those who agree to be “infected” to spread the virus to eight others, you could interpret“#PeetMeNotLeave” as a poetic response to the pandemic itself. It alleviates some of the loneliness writers feel because they can no longer socialize at readings. Not only that, but it restores a bit of the agency that’s been robbed from people by the real disease. Poets create their own pandemic to counter the actual one.
The hive mind goes oracular
One of the fascinating aspects of the marathon is the way the poems shared have begun speaking symbolically about its purpose. It’s like watching the collective intelligence of the so-called hive mind become self-aware.
One example, titled “Cloven”, comes from Nada Gordon, urging us to put “the Pan back/in pandemic…” The poem admits that for now, this can only be accomplished by our imaginations. But it suggests an infection-free method for generating some desperately-needed wildness: poetic wordplay. Here’s a sample…
From Pan comes panic and
also pandemonium
of which we’ve had plenty,
but, regrettably, without
the party. Pan: spreading, global,
covering everything. Panties, panthers,
pantalets, panaceas, pantoums
(this isn’t one) and pandas.
Let’s put the Pan
back in pandemic, but only in our
fertile minds. IRL let’s just
don masks, and wash our grubby hands,
and touch no pangolins or bats, or civets,
and swear off also
at least for the time being
all wild and hairy
chimerical strangers.
Owning the numbers
Another example of this reclaiming of agency is a collaboration between Loren Goodman and Pirooz Kalayeh titled “Poem About Math” (shared by Goodman). The poem was previously published, but appearing in this context it gains new meaning.
When I read this poem, I thought of a comment the philosopher Alain Badiou made regarding the numerical: “we live in the era of number’s despotism”, he writes, where “the imperative must be ‘count!’”
Badiou is thinking of how numbers boss us around. We are necessarily obsessed with everything from health statistics, to the latest political poll numbers, to the value of the arts—and even personhood—measured in “likes”, if not sales data.
In the pandemic, numbers determine our fates with a new power. Each day we watch the stats charting ratios between infections and death. We view charts of peaks, plateaus and the flattening of curves. In response to such situations, Badiou wonders, “Isn’t another idea of number necessary, in order for us to turn thought against the despotism of number?”
Goodman and Kalayeh’s poem takes a witty step in this direction. In it, numbers, rather than threatening our survival, become friends and even lovers. Here’s an excerpt:
Most of my friends are numbers
43, 38, 26, 73, 19
Boom—you won the lottery
So I have a lot of friends now
Most of whom, as I said, are numbers
What I really like about numbers
Is what I really like about friends
You can put them together
Subtract them, multiply, divide
They can be rational
Or irrational, variables
Or become infinite
Even imaginary!
My first imaginary number
Came in darkness
I was practicing word problems
For four hours a day
At a secondhand desk
On the second floor
Of our apartment in
Lawrenceville, New Jersey
When I suddenly realized:
This is not math
This is love
Judging from the quality of poems people have shared, if the “Russian Almanac” ever appears it will be a great read. More than that, it will represent one way during this era by which the literary world (excuse the pun) is taking its temperature.
Once upon a time, there was a poetry of consumerism.
I’m thinking here of how buying stuff was celebrated through the ironic creativity of mid 20th century urbanites. Rather than grousing about the vulgarity of their city, these souls were inspired by its arty and tacky qualities. Informed by a nearly utopian cornucopia of consumer goods, they created witty fables of abundance.
Think of the pop artists and their love of such consumables as canned soup, comic books and hamburgers. Or of Frank O’Hara, writing poems about strolling through Manhattan, shopping for a carton of Gauloises, an edition of Verlaine, a malted, or musing on the pleasures of sharing a coke with intimate friends.
Of course, New York City is still one of the world’s great shopping meccas. The process of gentrification has, if anything, created the need for more high-end stores. But this is why the appearance of another phenomenon seems all the more striking: the increasing presence of empty storefronts, sometimes whole blocks of them.
Perhaps we live in a time that demands another sort of poetry. Poems, for example, like this one, from (my better half) Elaine Equi:
RETAIL SPACE FOR RENT
Every day emptiness erases
big franchises
as well as small boutiques:
the place that sold small gadgets,
the place that specialized in hats.
It’s a commercial version
of the Rapture — leaving behind
a jigsaw puzzle of blank pieces,
each one an unopened invitation
to anyone with an ounce of creative vision
and the millions needed to back it up.
If this were a movie, aliens would be arriving
to set up their ministry,
but today even the sky seems vacant.
We’re dissolving the past
faster than we can manufacture the future.
Lots of everything must go.
Not enough coming soon.
Equi’s poem comes from her new book, The Intangibles. The title is prescient; confronted by such a phenomenon like disappearing stores, one can’t help but think that some mysterious, invisible process is taking place. Again, a look back to the time of Warhol and O’Hara, offers an illuminating contrast. In one of that era’s signature essays, Susan Sontag also described the apocalyptic image of empty stores:
“The trump card of the end-of-the-world movies...is that great scene with New York or London or Tokyo discovered empty, its entire population annihilated. Or, as in The World, the Flesh, and the Devil (1959), the whole movie can be devoted to the fantasy of occupying the deserted city and starting all over again -- Robinson Crusoe on a world-wide scale."
Equi’s poem of 2019 offers a perfect dialectical contrast with Sontag’s early 60s essay. In Sontag’s city, the people are gone, but the goods are left behind. In Equi’s, people still roam the streets, but it’s the consumer products that have disappeared.
Sontag’s offers a reflection on spectacle (film imagery); Equi’s poem is determined by an encounter with the Real — an emptiness stripped of signage altogether: “If this were a movie,” she writes, “aliens would be arriving, / to set up their ministry, / but today even the sky seems vacant.”
A Commercial Version of the Rapture
So, where exactly have all the goodies gone?
The short answer: they’ve gone to heaven.
Put another way, value once expressed itself in our world in the form of concrete, sensuous items, such as consumer goods. Today, thanks to the financialization of everyday life, it also has assumed an immaterial form; tangible value has become intangible — transformed into abstract equations.
Think about the history of money from the 60s till today. At one time, wealth was expressed through gold. This transformed into paper currency, which further evolved into credit card balances. The process of abstraction continued. In our day, there’s bitcoin — but on an even more abstract level, there are the trillions of dollars created by a few keystrokes at the Fed to prop up the economy during the last great crash.
Have you ever seen a physical penny of all that dough?
When it comes to the disappearing stores of Manhattan, a similar process is occurring. First off, in a “commercial version of the Rapture” as Equi puts it, these enterprises have been subsumed out of their earthly existence and now live their afterlives in the heaven of cyberspace.
But there’s an even more extreme process of abstraction taking place.
Though many merchants vacate their businesses because the rent is too high, the real estate companies that own them resist bringing down the cost. Why? I’ve read that unfilled stores equate to tax write-offs for their holding companies. Not only that, but exorbitant (or exaggerated) rents, when they appear on balance sheets, may puff up the value of such properties.
In other words, by incurring losses (empty stores), buildings may be increasing their worth. Which reminds me of what I’ve read about banks: that by acquiring liabilities (making loans which are backed by only a small fraction of the bank’s reserves), they increase their assets (their balance sheets record money owed them).
Dematerialization is a sign of the evolving sophistication (or desperation) of capitalism, as it discovers new ways to generate profit out of increasingly thinner air. In this light, empty storefronts might be read as a perverse index of economic progress.
And by the evidence of such signs, you can’t help but speculate that China has already reached a more advanced stage of capitalism than the U.S. For there, one encounters not mere empty stores or even neighborhoods, but whole ghost towns, built on the fantasy of a future which never arrived.
All which is to say, just because you can’t see, hear, smell, taste or even understand a phenomenon, doesn’t mean you can’t make a killing from it. And that we poor mortals, left behind in the wake of our vanishing world, can take solace.
For despite appearances, the city that is disappearing still exists, in some inscrutable way, in the realm of the intangible.
Can our thinking grasp our experience? Can our language adequately describe it?
A poem I came across recently by Laura Riding made me wonder. It's titled, appropriately, "Beyond." Check it out:
Beyond
Pain is impossible to describe
Pain is the impossibility of describing
Describing what is impossible to describe
Which must be a thing beyond description
Beyond description not to be known
Beyond knowing but not mystery
Not mystery but pain not plain but pain
But pain beyond but here beyond
What fascinates me about this rather Steinian poem is that it shows pain to be doubly painful. Pain hurts because that's what it does. But pain is also painful because words can't describe or express it -- it's beyond our ability to grasp rationally.
Riding is not alone in coming up empty, when faced with describing pain. Elaine Scarry, the author of The Body in Pain, a modern classic examining pain and culture, tells us that when it comes to physical pain, at least, the number of literary texts devoted to it, when compared to other experiential and emotional states, is "actually tiny."
And puzzlement about pain isn't just literary. "Philosophers of Mind", such as David Chalmers, write that though pain is usually associated with a part of the anatomy, it's "difficult to map directly onto any structure in the world or in the body." At the same time, though, Chalmers (and other philosophers and scientists) consider pain a "paradigm example of conscious experience."
In short, as Chalmers might put it, there's "something it's like" to be in pain, but this something is experiential and technical/scientific (or, perhaps even metaphoric/artistic) descriptions can't really get to it. It's got to be felt to be known.
This is why Riding's account of pain seems so apt. As common as it is, pain is neither something just ordinary and "plain", nor is it a mystery. Pain is just pain, and, as such, beyond rational cognition, but overwhelmingly present, i.e., it's near but far, a "here" that is also "beyond."
Or is it?
A book I've been reading lately, Discognition, by Steven Shaviro, made me aware that whether our words can communicate "what it's like" to experience pain, or, for that matter, other common sensations, is a question hotly debated among philosophers and scientists.
In fact, as Shaviro tells us, this issue gave rise to a famous thought experiment involving a hypothetical person named "Mary" and the experience of color.
In this experiment, we are asked to imagine that "Mary" is a person who, for all her life, has lived in a black and white room. She has never perceived color at all. At the same time, though, Mary knows everything there is to know about color. This includes "all the physical information", as well as whatever other "material" or "scientific fact" that color involves.
The question the experiment asks us to consider is whether, when "Mary" one day leaves the black and white room, and actually experiences color, does she learn anything new?
According to Shaviro, for some philosophers who study cognition, the answer is no. The information Mary already knows should be enough to grasp what color is.
For thinkers like Chalmers, and, I'm proposing, the Riding of this poem, the answer is yes. Color, like pain, is a qualitative state that must be experienced to be known.
Spiritual Realism
Riding's meditation on the failure of our language to describe pain made me wonder if the poem might not offer a good example of one of the goals she once described for her poetics: the achievement of what she termed a spiritual realism.
In her Introduction to her collected poems, Riding contrasts this sort of spirituality with that of religion. Where the latter offered the promise of a transcendent future to the believer, she hoped (at one time in her career) that poetry could offer a glimpse of ultimate truth grounded in the here and now, and arising from commonplace realities and experiences.
Perhaps a poem like "Beyond" shows us what what this sort of immanent transcendence looks like. It's common to characterize extraordinary mystical states as beyond concepts. Such moments, the story goes, can only be approximated later, and in halting, paradoxical language.
In my reading, "Beyond" insists, via its own paradoxical rhetoric, that many common experiences, such as pain, transcend our concepts as well. Such realities make us aware of the gap, a void, between our words and our lives.
And the fact that "Beyond" acknowledges this void may be the most "realistic" thing about it. As contemporary "speculative realist" Graham Harman puts it, "realism does not mean that we are able to state correct propositions about the real world. Instead, it means that reality is too real to be translated without remainder into any sentence..."
Or as Riding writes, "there is a sense of life so real that it becomes the sense of something more real than life...It is the meaning at work in what has no meaning; it is, at its clearest, poetry."
The final poem of Michael Lally's moving new collection, Swing Theory, keeps coming back to my mind. I think this is because it illustrates so well what's uniquely cool about poetic thinking. Check it out:
SWING THEORY: 5
When I first read about string theory I thought
What about swing theory? The ways the uni-
verse is secretly governed by the same laws
that sparked The Big Band Swing era, park
swings and taking a swing at something or
someone. I thought of "Swinging on a Star"
or Swing Time I mean the ways reality swings
not just in the Hegelian sense but in the re-
galing sense and sensitivity to the ego swings
and mood swings of The Creator or whatever
force initiated this swinging cosmic vibe we
call Being Here Now, always, where every
sound's a note in the song of everything, ev-
ery moment a scene in the movie of our lives.
String Theory, of course, is supposedly notoriously difficult to fully grasp. It's a theory, as I (dimly) understand it, whose ambition is no less than to integrate the discordant elements of contemporary physics (quantum theory vs. Einstein's version of gravity) into an elegant, visionary whole.
But rather than be struck speechless in the face of the "scientific sublime," the poet here, as thinker, uses it as springboard for inspiration, offering his own "grand unified theory" of the cosmos--presented from what the proto Beat performance artist Lord Buckley might have called the hipsomatic angle.
And that Lally's poem draws from music for its metaphors is no accident. String Theory itself is a sort of reinvention of the "music of the spheres." Here's how that authoritative text, The Complete Idiot's Guide to String Theory, describes it:
"String Theory...proposes that subatomic particles are sub-sub-subatomic strings. If we zoom in on the particles closely enough, what we usually think of as little billiard balls reveal themselves to be tiny loops or lengths of a more primitive material. These strings vibrate like miniature guitar strings, and each type of particle corresponds to a string playing a certain pitch--as though quarks were middle C, electrons were E flat, and the world around us were a symphony of unimaginable intricacy."
All of which is to say that poetic thought shares some deep similarities with that of science. In their impatience with conventional realities, both scientists and poets are thinkers who make a habit of (as philosopher Richard Rorty put it in another context) "looking for new interpretations of the Book of Nature."
Freethinkers Unite!
The jazzy, improvisatory freedom of a poem like "Swing Theory: 5" becomes especially striking in the context of the other poems in this book, some of which specifically address the reality of a brain not functioning as freely as the thinker would wish. This is the result of recovering from a (successful) brain surgery the poet underwent to remove a growth.
In "So, And" for example, a longer poem written specifically for a performance at DIA, the speaker remarks "I wanted to write/a special poem for/this night like I/sometimes have before/to tell what I know/as well as I know/my heart's scars". The poem continues like this:
"but my brain's scarred
now too and it doesn't
work as well as it once
did, nor do the connections
between my thoughts
and the fingers typing this"
As the poem continues (sometimes leaving in the errors that register the side-effects of the surgery), the speaker describes how even the shape of his desires has been modified. All of which throws another light on ideas of self-will, agency and even identity--or, put another way:
"[the] mysteries of what I always
believed was me
but now know as merely
electric impulses in
the thought battery
that's the hybrid
of my brain..."
These observations gain even more significance when you consider that they are part of a poem that ponders the struggle for artistic freedom (with the Chinese government) by the artist Ai Weiwei. From this perspective, the poet's internal fight to write the way he wants can be seen as a metaphor for preserving one's freedom against bigger forces beyond one's control--whether these forces take the form of physical or political laws.
And one way writers, artists and scientists all try to preserve this freedom is to step outside of the situations they face, by observing and reflecting upon them. As Rorty puts it, "mechanism stops, and freedom begins, at the point where we go metalinguistic--the point at which we can discuss which words best describe a given situation."
Swing Theory goes "meta" like this: the poems here are often encounters--with politics, one's past, or, in the examples I've given, scientific reality and its laws. But rather than let the nearly overwhelming power of these forces have the last say, the writing here re-describes them, translating them into a language of its own. One that swings.
Recently, a wonderfully witty and satiric book of poetry came my way -- Paul Fericano's The Hollywood Catechism. Among other things, it takes a playful look at the way celebrity worship almost resembles a religion. Here's the first poem:
The Actor's Creed
I believe in Brando,
the Godfather of enormous weight,
creator of mumbling and angst,
and in James Dean, his only ward, our Jim,
who was sold into celluloid by Jack Warner,
born of the hustler Strasberg,
suffered under Rock Hudson,
was speeding, died, and nominated;
descended into gossip hell;
and on his third film was chosen
again from the dead;
ascended into Giant heaven,
and is seated in a bathhouse with Brando
the Godfather of enormous weight;
from where he will come to judge
all performances.
I believe in the Holy Spielberg,
the holy casting couch,
the communion of press agents,
the forgiveness of Sally Field,
the resurrection of my career,
and life everlasting without Tom Hanks.
Amen.
Anyone who was raised Catholic will recognize that this is a rewrite of the Apostles Creed, recited during every Mass. Living up to its title, Fericano's Catechism features a number of poems that recast prayers, substituting famous movie people for sacred figures. There is "The Director's Prayer," which rewrites the Our Father, "The Halle Berry," a redo of the Hail Mary, and in place of the Sign of the Cross, here's "The Sign of the Double Cross":
In the name of the Bogart,
and of the Cagney,
and of the Holy Edward G.
Amen, see?
We Have Never Been Disenchanted
As I was thinking about why these poems work so well, I came across a fascinating essay by cultural critic Eugene McCarraher. In it, the author takes issue with a cliche about modernity -- that with the coming of science, technology and the skepticism of the Enlightenment, our world became, in the words of Max Weber, "disenchanted" (i.e., divested of the spirits, oracles and animism of an earlier age).
McCarraher argues instead that "we have never been disenchanted." For once the old gods and spirits fled the modern world, the holy beings and objects of popular culture replaced them: movie stars, celebrities, and an endless chain of luxurious products that carry their own magical auras and promises of power.
McCarraher reasons that this new "mysticism" is made possible by the spectacles of Capitalism, in which the rich and famous are portrayed as nearly miraculous, and the products they promote almost sacramental. All of which suggests that we are just as brainwashed by this new creed as people once were by older beliefs.
The Pragmatism of Celebrity Worship
Such ideas are useful for explaining the source of the wit in Fericano's book -- for what these poems do is make explicit what's implied by celebrity culture: they pretend to take the idea of celebrity worship literally.
But I say pretend (and this is where I differ a bit from the essay I mentioned) because, of course, no one really worships celebrities. Ripping a picture of Brando in half won't get the same reaction as doing the same thing with the Pope's. Despite the common belief that we're living in a "secular age," there's still a hierarchy of the sacred and profane. If this weren't true, these poems wouldn't be as funny as they are.
All of which leads me to wonder -- if we don't use celebrities in search of a (lost?) sense of transcendence, what are they good for?
I think a poem like "The Actor's Creed" offers a clue. Actors do, after all, follow a creed: the vocabulary of gestures established by the "greats" who came before them. And so do we. Like actors, consciously or not, we also sometimes incorporate the mannerisms, expressions and even fashion sense of our favorite stars into the way we perform our identities and the roles we're asked to play. Among other things, this is a way of displaying a sort of (pop) culture literacy.
In other words, instead of using such images to transcend daily life, we take them up as tools to participate in it. (See Alva Noe's Strange Tools.) This is why, as "godly" as they are, such figures are always marked by an amusing sense of worldliness.
It's also why invoking them in poetry, usually thought of as the realm of "high art," can sometimes have a satirically corrosive (and populist) effect -- even when it comes to literary "holiness." In this book, for example, Ginsberg's Howl becomes The Howl of Lon Chaney, Jr. (the actor who played the Wolfman in the classic 1941 film).
Frank O'Hara once wrote that people shouldn't be forced to read poetry, especially because most of it wasn't "as good as the movies" anyway. I like to think he composed poems beginning with lines like "Lana Turner has collapsed!" to help remedy the situation.
In The Hollywood Catechism, I found lots of the same sort of irreverent attitude -- and fun.
For years, it seems, I've been fascinated with something Wallace Stevens' wrote in an essay about poet Marianne Moore in The Necessary Angel:
"To confront fact in its total bleakness," Stevens states, "is for any poet a completely baffling experience."
It's hard not to identify with this sentiment. There's something about the idea of a "fact" that seems settled, lifeless, and often threatening. To "face the facts", whatever the facts may be, is rarely pleasant.
And you can see why a poet like Stevens would write a sentence like this. One of the major moves of his poetry is to embellish the everyday facts of life -- its customary sights, sounds and perceptions -- until they're almost unrecognizable. He's a little like a jazz improviser who takes off on a corny, traditional melody and dances ecstatically around it.
Stevens' statement also reflects something innate about our thought processes. Cognitively speaking, we enjoy much less freedom (or control) over our basic perceptions of the objects that make up our world than the objects of our thoughts. Philosopher of mind, Jerry Fodor, in his classic book The Modularity of Mind, puts it this way:
"We have only the narrowest options about how the objects of perception shall be represented, but we have all the leeway in the world as to how we shall represent the objects of thought; outside perception, the way that one deploys one's cognitive resources, is, in general, rationally subservient to one's utilities."
In addition to this feature of our mental architecture, though, Stevens' statement brought to mind another critique of the "fact," this time, not from the viewpoint of a poetic idealist like himself, but rather, a historical materialist (the very type of thinker you'd assume would be in love with facts).
A few decades before Stevens' essay of the 40s, social critic Georg Lukacs wrote this about the oppression of facts, in his renowned work on reification:
"...in the 'facts' we find the crystallization of the essence of capitalist development into an ossified, impenetrable thing alienated from man...When confronted by the rigidity of these 'facts' every movement seems like a movement impinging on them, while every tendency to change them appears to be a merely subjective principle (a wish, a value judgement, an ought)."
One of the realities Lukacs alludes to here is that much of what appears as the "solid", "factual", and "objective" elements of our world, are actually malleable parts of a larger process. The objects of Lukacs' era, and our own, gain much of their sense of objectivity through their utility -- for the sciences, industry, or especially, for their economic value. To thinkers like Lukacs, what makes the facts of the world seem alienating is that they are expressions of a largely inhuman machine-like system, interested more in calculation and profit than the pleasures of creative play or meaning (elements often relegated, like poetry itself, to the realm of the trivial, subjective whim).
The Weird Facts of Marianne Moore's Poetry
What fascinates Stevens about Marianne Moore's poetry is that, though it is loaded with facts, it rarely succumbs -- or even complains about -- alienation or boredom. Rather, Moore's "facts" are as animated as her poems.
How is this possible? The answer might be: there are facts, and then there are facts. The facts Moore uses in her poems are sometimes arcane, and she uses them in eccentric ways. Rather than the practical facts of calculation, or perhaps an encyclopedia, her facts are useless outside of a poem.
To illustrate, Stevens focuses on her poem, "He 'Digesteth Harde Yron,'" about the ostrich. Stevens comments on the atypical quality of her description:
"Somehow there is a difference between Miss Moore's bird and the bird of the Encyclopaedia. The difference grows when she describes her bird as
The friend
of hippotigers and wild
asses, it is as
though schooled by them he was
the best of the unflying
pegassi.
The difference signalizes a transition from one reality to another. It is the reality of Miss Moore that is the individual reality. The of the Encyclopaedia is the reality of isolated fact. Miss Moore's reality is significant. An aesthetic of integration is a reality."
What Stevens is saying, basically, is that Moore makes the fact of the ostrich her own. And how she does this is by employing "useless" (arcane, antiquarian) facts in an act of playful, non-economic labor (how much money can you make by writing a poem?). Moore works hard at the intelligent waste of of time.
This is why Stevens reads the title of this poem as a key to Moore's writing: her own work "Digesteth" the "Harde Yron" of facts -- and turns them, through her own alchemical processes, into something that lives: a poem.
Recently I came across a passage in Sphere, A.R. Ammons' long poem, that caught my interest by the way it drew a parallel between natural and cultural evolution:
15
in the generations and becomings of our minds, anthologies,
good sayings are genes, the images, poems, stories
chromosomes and the interminglings of these furnish beginnings
within continuities, continuities within trials, mischances,
fortunate forwardings: gene pool, word hoard: the critic
samples the new thing, he turns it over in his consideration,
he checks alignments, proportions, he looks into the body of
the anthology to see if the new thing hooks in, distorts, to raise
or ruin: he considers the weight, clarity, viability of
the new thing and reconsiders the whole body of the anthology:
if the new thing finds no attachment, if energy, cementing,
does not flow back and forth between it and the anthology,
16
it dies, withered away from the configuration of the people...
The "sphere" Ammons writes about in this poem is the earth. And though I'm still in the midst of reading Sphere, I can see how integrating the two "evolutions" is in keeping with the poem's themes, as all the topics and images it presents are swept up into a single, self-modifying ecology.
But there's also a historical aspect about these lines that interests me. Ammons' poem was originally published in 1974. Two years later, science writer Richard Dawkins offered a similar analogy between biological and cultural evolution in The Selfish Gene. Except, instead of referring to "literary" genes and chromosomes, as Ammons does, Dawkins coined the now famous term "memes" (which sounds a little like "genes," but also connotes [cultural] memory). Here's how he defined his new word:
"Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation. If a scientist hears, or reads about, a good idea, he passes it on to his colleagues and students. He mentions it in his articles and his lectures. If the idea catches on, it can be said to propagate itself, spreading from brain to brain."
Dawkins casts a wider cultural net than Ammons but, nevertheless, if you replace the "scientist" in his prose with the "critic" in Sphere, you have a fairly good analogy between the two concepts.
The Decline and Fall of the "Meme"
Since the 70s, I've read, the whole idea of "memes" has been pretty much discredited as far as its scientific value goes. The philosopher Massimo Pigliucci writes that "we don't know how to define memes in a way that is operationally useful to the practicing scientist, we don't know why some memes are successful and others not, and we have no clue as to the physical substrate, if any, of which memes are made. Tellingly, the Journal of Memetics closed a few years ago for lack of submissions."
The "meme" concept has also come under fire from cultural criticism. It's often seen as another "reductionist" product of scientism -- that form of intellectual overreach through which materialist thinkers seek to explain things they know little about by ascribing them, in some crude way, to processes borrowed from the natural sciences.
The only area, in fact, where the concept still has currency is the web. But rather than something governed by "critics" or "scientists," the meme has become a populist, occasionally (mildly) subversive creation, as people joyously replicate, mutate and circulate endless goofy pictures of cats, celebrities, politicians and optical illusions.
The Return of Cultural Evolution
Despite the fate of "memes," the desire to discover patterns of cultural evolution has not gone away -- nor, for that matter, the pursuit of approaches to literature that use tools pioneered in the natural sciences.
The relatively new field of "digital humanities" is a case in point. Because of the quickly growing digital archive of texts, both popular and "canonical," scholars are now able to pursue increasingly systematic, quantifiable approaches to literature. They are beginning, for example, to be able to trace the way basic stylistic traits in the novel change between centuries.
Science scholar Armand Marie Leroi has written recently that this area of study may result in "something resembling the theory of organic evolution..." and will draw on fields such as "epidemiology, cognitive psychology and behavioral economics," along with the literary analysis of critics who interpret what these methods discover.
All of which makes me wonder if we're witnessing a shift. Over the past 30 years or so, cultural critics have often been fascinated with the idea of viewing science through the lens of literature. Perhaps now they are becoming enchanted by imagining what literature looks like in the eyes of a scientist. Thoughts?
Nowadays, one hears so much about innovation that the very concept has become banal. It almost seems like there is nothing less innovative than the pursuit of innovation.
This is why I found a poem I came across recently by William Bronk so fascinating. Instead of offering more of the breathless rhetoric of change, it paints a picture of a world where everything remains stubbornly the same. It's titled "We Want the Mark of Time," and it begins like this:
We know what men felt once, as if they feel
forever, as if we feel. The anguishes
of ancients, their ecstasies, recorded once
and unforgotten, even their trivial times,
are so much ours, it is as if we were
no more than ants, a bird, or any beast
fixed in a closed, instinctive pattern...
I remember reading somewhere that what supposedly distinguished humanity from the rest of the animal kingdom was our ability to create history -- through recording, remembering, and hopefully learning from it. In Bronk's poem, this capability vanishes; we are just as repetitively instinctual as the rest of living creatures.
It's almost as if we live in the type of universe once proposed by Parmenides, where all is one and static -- the changes we notice merely an illusory play of surfaces. This sense of stasis seems almost painful to Bronk's speaker. He states, a little later in the poem:
.....................................We look almost
in puzzlement at someone younger about
to feel or learn what we, as if for him,
as if for everyone, have learned, have felt.
There is no need, we think. We move as if
to stop him. Why should he do what we have done?
The poem goes on to ask, "How shall we think of time without a change?" Instead of an answer, it ends with a haunting image and a sense of longing:
Oh, it is with desire we read of suns
that some day burn themselves to darkness. At night
we search the sky for such a sign: that there
should be time, an ending. We want the mark of time.
Of course, such lines, which long for evidence of change, run contrary to the common sense of our own times -- marked by, as I mentioned, a breathlessness regarding everything from the speed of globalization, digitization, and human self-transformation, to troubling realities like the degradation of the environment. But Bronk's poem (circa 1956) must have seemed at odds with its own time as well.
Sontag and "The Imagination of Disaster"
As Susan Sontag analyzed in "The Imagination of Disaster," popular culture, beginning in 1950 and up until the time time of her essay (1963), was obsessed with images of catastrophic change, not unlike the dying stars Bronk's poem longs for, but does not witness. Sontag hypothesized that the reality of the bomb inspired this; she proposed that translating the possibility of annihilation into entertaining, fantastic films enabled people to cope with such fears better in daily life.
Reading Bronk's poem brought to my mind, for example, the classic science fiction disaster film When Worlds Collide (1951), where a "rogue star" (or burning sun, as Bronk might put it) is due to crash into the earth.
But there is another element in Sontag's essay that suggests Bronk was also right about the lack of change he registers. For she writes that her time is not only afflicted with "inconceivable terror," but also "unremitting banality" (a reference, perhaps, to the much written about conformism of the era). Thus, the other function of the films she covers is to provide a vision of relief from the humdrum:
"The lure of the generalized disaster as a fantasy is that it releases one from normal obligations. The trump card of the end-of-the-world movies...is that great scene with New York or London or Tokyo discovered empty, its entire population annihilated. Or, as in The World, the Flesh, and the Devil (1959), the whole movie can be devoted to the fantasy of occupying the deserted city and starting all over again -- Robinson Crusoe on a world-wide scale."
In light of all this, I think there's a sense in which Bronk's poem is relevant to our own time. Ever since the dawn of so-called postmodernism, there is a common complaint about the changlessness of our culture -- that we're in a mere recycling mode, with nothing new on the horizon. Only the other day, for example, I attended a show at MOMA titled: "The Forever Now: Contemporary Painting in an Atemporal World."
The same dynamic Sontag discusses may be behind the contemporary popularity of the dystopian film. Such offerings may not only help us cope with our own fears of catastrophe, but also offer a strange sort of hope that the old order will someday be gone, so that we can start anew.
Or, as Bronk would put it, perhaps we too want the mark of time.
I'm very happy to be part of Radio Free Albion's series of podcasts with poets. Thanks to Tony Trigilio for interviewing me on my new book of poems, The Cheapskates. Check it out here.